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 We conduct Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the biases of
 assuming a misspecified demand model. We study continuous models
 (linear, log-linear and AIDS), and discrete choice models (logit) in the
 context of differentiated products and aggregate data. Estimating
 demand with the 'wrong' model yields varying degrees of bias in
 estimated elasticities, but the logit model can yield unbiased estimates
 for a certain size ofthe assumed market potential. Merger simulations
 confirm the key importance of market potential in logit estimation
 suggesting that a discrete choice model may be preferable even when the
 discreteness ofthe purchase decision is questionable.
 I. INTRODUCTION
 Empirical analyses of markets are increasingly becoming more tightly
 linked to theory. This structural approach to estimation often requires
 demand and supply estimates, and these estimates need to be precise if one
 wants inference to be reliable. While markets are comprised of demand and
 supply, demand estimation has become the main focus of empirical analyses.
 One reason for a greater interest in demand is that supply side data is less
 commonly available, especially at the product-level. In addition, advances
 have been made to make supply inference feasible with unobserved cost data
 (Bresnahan [1989]).
 Demand estimates are the key ingredient in empirical analyses such as
 merger simulation and product introductions, yet the biases that may arise
 from employing the incorrect demand model have received little attention.
 Our analysis focuses on two strands of demand models that have become
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 popular in empirical studies of differentiated products: discrete choice
 models and representative consumer (also called continuous choice) models.
 Discrete choice models assume that consumers choose one unit of the brand
 that yields the highest utility. Continuous choice models, on the other hand,
 do not impose such restriction.1
 While continuous choice models have a longer history in applied work,
 discrete choice models are now the more popular choice because of their
 parsimony in dealing with many own- and cross-price coefficients that
 typically arise with brand level data.2 However, recent advances now allow
 researchers to reduce the number of parameters in continuous choice models
 to a manageable level (Pinkse, Slade and Brett [2002]; Rojas [2008]). We
 focus on aggregate data models (the econometrician only observes total
 quantity purchased in a market) because it is here that the purchase decision
 assumption is less clear to the researcher (i.e., the discreteness of the process
 may be verified with micro-level data).
 In this paper, we use a simple controlled environment to study the biases
 that arise when demand is estimated with a misspecified model, especially
 when the assumed purchase decision is incorrect. We focus on the bias of the
 primary structural parameters of interest, price-elasticities, and study the
 implications of such biases in merger simulation. We consider four demand
 models that have been popular in empirical applications; three continuous
 choice models: linear, log-linear and the Almost Ideal Demand System
 (Deaton and Muellbauer [1980]) and one discrete choice model: logit. Table I
 presents a list of recent studies that have used these four types of functional
 forms (typically in more complex variations than the ones presented here) to
 model demand with aggregate data. We believe log-linear is an unpopular
 model partly because it implies a (restrictive) constant elasticity. In our
 simulations below, log-linear also produces results with particular patterns.
 Our general approach is to generate equilibrium price and quantity data
 for four types of duopoly markets comprised of stochastic demand and
 supply (i.e., the error term and exogenous covariates come from a
 distribution). All four duopoly markets have the same cost function but a
 different demand specification, each corresponding to one of the four
 models we are interested in. The demand parameters of each market are
 calibrated so that own- and cross-price elasticities at the equilibrium prices
 and quantities are the same across the four duopolies. We consider several
 cases of own- and cross-price elasticities to assess the sensitivity of our results
 1 Discrete and continuous choice models differ in other dimensions but we shall loosely
 distinguish the difference between these two types of models according to their assumption
 about the consumer's purchase decision.
 2 Other advantages of discrete choice models are: a) consumer heterogeneity can be modeled
 in the most flexible form of discrete choice models (i.e., random coefficients), and 2) product
 introductions can be studied more easily.
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal oflndustrial
 Economics.
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 Table I
 Recent Applied Demand Analyses with Different Functional Forms
 Author(s) Year Demand Functional Form
 Porter 1983 Log-Linear
 Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong 1992 Linear
 Hausman, Leonard and Zona 1994 AIDS
 Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995 Logit
 Hausman 1996 AIDS
 Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta 1996 Linear
 Besanko, Gupta and Jain 1998 Logit
 Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim 2000 Linear
 Nevo 2001 Logit
 Sudhir 2001a Logit
 Sudhir 2001b Logit
 Hausman and Leonard 2002 AIDS
 Chintagunta, Dube and Singh 2003 Logit
 Besanko, Dube and Gupta 2003 Logit
 Slade 2004 Linear
 Dube and Manchanda 2005 Linear
 Khan and Jain 2005 Logit
 Chintagunta and Dube 2005 Logit
 Rojas 2006 AIDS
 to different parameterizations. We then use the generated data to
 consistently estimate demand with both the true and the other three
 misspecified models and analyze the biases defined by the difference between
 the estimated elasticities and the elasticities at the true parameters. We
 finally study the implications of demand misspecification on the accuracy of
 simulated post-merger equilibria.
 We acknowledge the fact that the choice of demand functional form is
 typically driven by the application at hand and also by computational
 limitations, but the researcher often faces some flexibility in functional form
 choice. Our results should hence be useful to improve such choice for cases in
 which the researchers can select a model. Also, our results can illuminate the
 potential biases of prior applications in which the choice of demand
 functional form may be questionable: e.g., discrete choice models have been
 employed to study markets where it is very likely that consumers may
 purchase multiple units of a particular brand or multiple brands in the same
 shopping trip (e.g., breakfast cereals, beer, soft drinks).
 In general, any type of misspecification will yield unreliable estimates and
 thus our results could be somewhat anticipated. However, in addition to the
 arguments given in the last paragraph, our approach to studying
 misspecification is important for at least two reasons. Quantifying the
 direction and magnitude of biases via simulation is important because an
 analytical method is not always capable of determining when biases are
 important. Our simulations indeed support this argument by showing not
 only when misspecification biases arise but also in which cases they can be
 reduced or eliminated. Second, our focus is on structural misspecification
 rather than statistical misspecification, which means that the parameters of
 .< 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ( 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal oflndustrial Economics.
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 interest have an economic interpretation: this is important because
 applications such as merger simulation rely on having precise structural
 (instead of reduced-form) estimates. To account for the structural nature of
 markets, we adopt a stochastic environment where equilibrium price and
 quantity are determined by demand and supply and we estimate the
 economic parameters via instrumental variables.
 An important reason why researchers have devoted important efforts to
 model demand for differentiated products has been the challenging issue of
 estimating numerous substitution parameters when there are many brands
 (Reiss and Wolak [2007]). Given these advances, the reader may thus deem
 our analysis of two products as a restrictive case, hence we must address this
 potential criticism. First, restricting the analysis to two products reduces the
 computational burden and eliminates other confounds in our experiment.
 For example, extending the experiment to three products implies calibrating
 a 3 x 3 matrix of elasticities in each model which proved to be a non-trivial
 task. In addition, with more than two products, the IIA property of logit
 becomes a restriction that needs to be addressed with a model such as
 random coefficients. We attempted such simulations with some success but
 they raised a variety of issues that may be better addressed in a separate
 paper as they would distract from the central results of our simulations
 here.3 Importantly, we have reason to believe that some of our main results
 here may extend to more complex models and to markets with more than
 two products. For example, our finding (below) that assuming a precise
 market potential for logit is crucial in the two product case appears to be just
 as important in some preliminary simulations with a 3-product random
 coefficients logit.
 Our results indicate that biases in estimates of own- and cross-price
 elasticities are typically largest when 'continuous choice' models (linear, log
 linear, AIDS) are used to estimate the discrete choice model (logit), and vice
 versa.4 However, a pattern in the latter misspecification suggests that logit
 has an advantage over continuous choice models: when misspecified, logit's
 3 Some of these issues are: 1) if data is generated with a random coefficients model and then
 estimated with the same model (i.e., no misspecification), frequent convergence problems arise
 if a different set of random draws (than the ones used to generate the data) are employed, 2) as
 the number of random draws increases (which would theoretically give more precise estimates)
 convergence becomes more problematic, 3) which technique for generating random draws is
 more desirable to solve issues 1) and 2).
 4 Misspecifications only produce 'magnitude' biases but no 'sign' biases (i.e., estimated own
 price elasticities are positive and estimated cross-price elasticities are negative). The absence of
 sign biases is not general, however, as logit (and more complex variations of it - nested logit,
 random coefficients logit) always forces cross-price elasticities to be positive, even if the
 simulation assumed product complementarity. In addition, in section 4 we discuss a case when
 a 'sign' bias can arise when representative consumer models are used to estimate data generated
 by a logit model.
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 biases in own- and cross-price elasticities increase as the assumed market
 potential gets large or small but disappear as the assumed market potential
 approaches a specific value.5 Intuitively, market potential gives the logit
 model a degree of freedom that allows it to approximate elasticities of
 models that do not assume a discrete purchase decision. However, this
 advantage can also play against logit when the econometrician only observes
 aggregate quantity data: if the assumed market potential is incorrect, logit
 may fail to recover the true own- and cross-price elasticities even when
 correctly specified.
 Continuous choice models, when logit is the true model, produce own
 and cross-price elasticities that are usually biased (20-30% larger or smaller
 than the true logit elasticity). However, there is a large variation in the
 estimated elasticities across simulations which renders all cross-price
 elasticities and some own-price elasticities statistically insignificant. As
 opposed to the logit model, continuous choice models estimates are not
 biased when correctly specified or even when the wrong continuous choice
 model (e.g., AIDS used to estimate linear) is employed.
 We consider two types of merger simulations: a) post-merger prices, and
 b) the (reduced) marginal cost needed to keep post-merger prices at the pre
 merger levels (also called 'compensating marginal' cost; Werden [1996]). In
 post-merger price simulations we find that in the presence of misspecifica
 tion, logit appears to be a reasonably accurate model whereas continuous
 choice models tend to perform less accurately. Compensating marginal cost
 simulations are consistent with elasticity results: logit's ability to predict
 correctly the true marginal cost reduction crucially depends on the assumed
 market potential, and continuous choice models tend to perform poorly
 when data is generated by logit.
 The next sections present a brief review of related literature, the model and
 methods used, and a detailed description ofthe misspecification biases. We
 also discuss the economic intuition behind our results and the implications
 of the identified misspecification patterns for merger simulations and for
 applied demand research in general.
 II. PRIOR LITERATURE
 Our work contributes to the broad literature on functional form
 misspecification which has shown that biases arise when the wrong
 functional form is assumed (e.g., White [1980]). Since our specific interest
 is in biases that arise in structural estimation of demand for differentiated
 products and the economic importance of these biases in merger
 simulations, we focus on the most relevant literature in these fields.
 5 This value is not the same for own- and cross-price elasticities, but usually close.
 Z 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 The usual practice when simulating post-merger equilibria is first to
 estimate demand with a particular functional form and recover (usually
 constant) marginal costs from firms' first order conditions in a Bertrand
 Nash game. Post-merger prices are then calculated using the recovered
 marginal costs and the demand estimates. Applications of this type to
 particular industries include Hausman, Leonard and Zona [1994], Hausman
 and Leonard [1997], Nevo [2000] and Werden [2000]. These studies,
 however, typically do not explore the sensitivity of their results to other
 plausible demand specifications, which is one ofthe focuses of our study.
 Some papers have begun to address the accuracy of different demand
 functional forms in predicting the actual post merger prices in industries for
 which pre and postmerger prices are available (Peters [2006]; Weinberg
 [2008]), and have, in general, found that merger simulations do not
 accurately predict the observed post merger prices.
 The most related study to our paper is that of Crooke et al. [1999], as they
 also conduct Monte Carlo experiments to analyze how four different
 demand functional forms (the same ones we are considering here) give rise to
 different prices and elasticities after a merger occurs. Crooke et al. employ a
 setup that is similar to ours: oligopoly price competition with differentiated
 products and constant marginal cost. The authors set the pre-merger
 equilibrium prices, quantities and elasticities equal across models and then
 search for the post-merger prices and elasticities. Crooke et al. conclude that
 post-merger prices and elasticities depend heavily on the assumed functional
 form. As opposed to our work, however, Crooke et al. assume that
 equilibrium price and quantity are given deterministically (rather than
 stochastically) and that the researcher knows with certainty the parameters
 of the true demand model. Hence, our approach is different to that of
 Crooke et al. in two fundamental ways: a) we adopt an econometric
 methodology (i.e., we consistently estimate the structural demand para
 meters) and b) we analyze the consequences of structural misspecification
 (i.e., using the wrong demand functional form).
 III. THE MODEL
 We adopt the general approach of recent empirical work of assuming price
 competition with differentiated products (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
 [1995]; Pinkse, Slade and Brett [2002]) and focus on a duopoly with single
 product firms. Because our approach is econometric in nature, we define all
 equations with a stochastic error term.
 III(i). Demand
 Logit Demand. Consumer fs utility of choosing brandy is given by:
 Uij = Po + PxXj - CCPj + ?j + Ey
 Z 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation Z 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 where x is the observed product characteristic,/? is price, ? is the unobserved
 product characteristic6, ? is a stochastic term representing consumer /'s
 idiosyncratic utility component. We adopt Berry's [1994] approach of
 including the unobserved (to the econometrician) product characteristic
 in the utility function, which is correlated with the equilibrium price.
 The consumer has the option of not purchasing either good; the utility of
 the outside good is denoted u0t and is normalized to a constant: 0. If Ey
 follows a type I extreme value distribution, the probability of consumer
 /choosing brandy (since we assume homogeneous consumers, we drop the
 / subscript) is:
 pr = exp(/?0 + pxxj - ccpj + <gy)
 1 1 + ELl eXP(A) + Px*k - OCPk + &)
 where Sj denotes the quantity (q) share of goody (i.e., Sj ? qj/ J2k Qk)\ the
 second equality holds if each consumer buys one unit. Elasticities and price
 derivatives are defined as:
 _ f-Gtpk(l - Sj) if j = k
 dsj_ = (-ot(l - Sj)sj if j = k
 dpk \ ccskSj ifj + k
 For estimation purposes, we use Berry's transformed version of the market
 share equation:7
 In sj - In s0 = A) + Pxxi - uPi + fy
 Where s0 is the market share of the outside alternative of not buying any
 of the inside goods. It is important to note that the size of s0 indirectly
 determines own- and cross-price elasticities.
 The term s0 is directly determined by the size of the normalized utility for
 the outside good, w0 (with a larger u0 implying a larger s0), and indirectly
 determined by the size of the constant term in the utility of the inside goods,
 Po (with a larger /30 implying a smaller s0). While in the simulations below
 we calibrate s0 (and other parameters) so that elasticities are equal across
 demand specifications, the stochastic nature of demand implies that s0, S\
 and s2 will vary in each simulation.
 6 We adopt the case of a coefficient equal to one for the unobserved product characteristic.
 Alternatively, one can specify ? to have a coefficient. Our results are not sensitive to this
 assumption.
 7 This is the strategy adopted by most studies (e.g., Berry [1994]).
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 Linear and Log-Linear Demand The system of two demand equations is:
 %' = aJ + ^2k bJkPk + Pxxj + ?y, 7 = 1,2
 where x, as in the logit case, can be thought of as a product characteristic or,
 more naturally, as a demand shifter and ? is an unobserved demand shock
 which is analogous to the unobserved product characteristic of the logit
 model (i.e., it is correlated with price because of simultaneity). The log-linear
 demand system is identical to the linear except that quantity and price are
 replaced by their 'log' values. Elasticities and price derivatives are
 straightforward in these two cases.
 Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) As with the logit model, there are
 two commodities (1 and 2) and an outside good (0). The AIDS model is
 defined in 'sales share' form (w7):
 wj = aJ + J2k y* los(p*) + Pj log( w + Zj
 where :
 log P = a + ^ ai log(p/) + - ]TZ Y,m lim log(p/) log(/?m)
 wj = -^-; (Xj = ocj + pxxj\ X = ^kPtqk\ 7, k,l,me (0,1,2)
 We impose the theoretical restrictions of homogeneity and adding up:
 Ey <*/ = 1; Ey 7jk = J2k 7jk = Ey Pj = ?; and symmetry: yjk = ykj. The para
 meters of the outside good are defined according to the theoretical
 restrictions: a0 = 1 - a2 - ai, j80 = ~P2~ P\, 7io = 7oi = ?Vn - 7i2>
 720 ? 702 ? ?7l2 ~ 722' 700 = ~701 ~~ 702 ? ""710 ~~ 720
 Strategic interaction takes place between goods 1 and 2 and the price of
 the outside good is assumed to be fixed. To simplify computation, and
 without loss of generality, we set a = 1, p0 = 1 and hold X constant. Our
 three demand equations are thus defined as:
 K-jg;)+ELi(7>-i8;^iog^)+ig;iog^-f^+y
 qj~ Pj
 where P = 7ti[log(pi)]2+y12log(pi)log02) + 722[1?g(/?2)]2 and the super
 script '*' indicates that the original parameter has been rescaled by X.
 Elasticities and price derivatives are:
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 % = ? \y% - P] (?* + Y,, yu 1?zpi)} - 5?
 jr = ? k - P}(?* + E,y*lo^)l ~ **?
 f 1 if 7 = it where, cU = { x [ 0 otherwise
 The assumed 'dollar' market potential (i.e. X) only enters elasticities
 as a rescaling factor for the estimated coefficients (y*k,Pj)- This is in
 contrast to the logit model where the non-linear specification does
 not allow different market potentials to be 'absorbed' via parameter
 rescaling.
 Ill(ii). Supply
 Firmy's profit function is defined as:
 Uj = (pj - mcj)qi - Fj
 ? (pj ? mcj)sj M ? Fj
 where n denotes profit, mc is marginal cost q is quantity, F denotes fixed cost,
 and M is the market potential for this duopoly market (M = Yll=o Qk)- We
 assume that marginal cost is independent of quantity and employ Berry's
 specification:
 mc. _ eyo+yxXj+y0><J>.i+<rcZj+(Tr,rij
 where, x is the observed product characteristic, co is a cost shifter, ? is the
 unobserved product characteristic, oc is the standard deviation of ?, rj is the
 supply shock and oY] is the standard deviation for rj.
 We also assume a static setting in which each firm maximizes its profit in
 each time period (we have omitted the time subscript for simplicity). Firmy's
 first order condition is:
 / x 9s j
 (Pj-mCj)gjf + SJ = 0
 After replacing marginal cost gives the following supply equation in
 logarithmic form:
 log pj = log (\dsj/dpj\y Sj + y0 + yxXj + yw<Oj + gc?j + a^}
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 IV. MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENTS
 IV(i). Data Generation
 For each ofthe four duopolies, we randomly draw 500 values for x9(d,?9 and
 rj from a standard normal distribution. The marginal cost parameters are the
 same across the four duopolies: y0 = 1, yx = 0.5, and yw = ac = a? = 0.25
 whereas the constants and the price coefficients of each demand model are
 calibrated so that the elasticities at the equilibrium prices and quantities are
 as close as possible across the four duopolies.8
 We analyze symmetric duopolies and study three elasticity cases: medium
 own-price elasticity (~- 1.70) with medium cross-price elasticity (~? 1.40)
 [M/M]; medium own-price elasticity (~ ? 2.00) with low cross-price
 elasticity (~-0.60) [M/L]; and high own-price elasticity (~-3.00) with
 low cross-price elasticity (~- 0.60) [H/L].9 The M/M case corresponds to
 one ofthe two cases in Berry's Monte Carlo experiment, which we consider
 our baseline.10 The other two cases reflect values that are commonly found
 in concentrated oligopolies (see Crooke et al.).11
 For each ofthe 500 draws (a 'data set'), we compute the equilibrium prices
 and quantities. The linear case has an analytical solution whereas the other
 three cases require numerical methods. We do this exercise 100 times for each
 elasticity case and each demand specification and take these data to
 estimation. There are, in total, 12 different cases (4 demand specifications x
 3 elasticity cases), each with 50,000 data points (100 data sets of 500
 observations each).
 IV(ii). Estimation
 For each of the 100 data sets in each of the 12 combinations of demand
 specifications and elasticities, we compute four sets of structural parameters
 and elasticities, one with the true model and the other three with misspecified
 models. Elasticities are computed at the mean values ofthe 500 equilibrium
 prices and quantities of each data set.
 8 Because of their unit-free nature, we measure the misspecification bias in terms of
 elasticities.
 9 A recent empirical generalization of price elastiticies (Bijmolt et al, [2005]) found an
 average own-price elasticity of -2.62 based on 1,851 elasticities documented in published
 research. Our definition of medium and low own-price elasticity is somewhat consistent with
 this finding. We are not aware of similar work on cross-price elasticities.
 10 Berry considers two cases in his simulation exercises, one with a coefficient of one for the ?,
 term in the indirect utility function and the other with a coefficient of three. Our logit model
 corresponds to Berry's first case. We were able to replicate Berry's results successfully for both
 cases.
 1 x Our cross-price elasticity is larger than the mean cross-price elasticity that Crooke et al.
 obtain in their analysis of mergers in oligopolies composed of 4 (to 8) firms. The reason for our
 choice is that a duopoly is more likely to have a larger cross-price elasticity than an oligopoly
 with three or more firms.
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 Note that with aggregate data (the focus of this paper), only quantities of
 the inside goods (qj) are observed. Thus, market shares needed for the
 estimation of logit demand can only be defined after assuming a 'market
 potential' M (i.e., the size of the market if all consumers chose an inside
 option). Put differently, when using the logit specification, the size of the
 outside alternative, s0, is unknown; this is crucial as s0 indirectly determines
 elasticities in the logit model (see section 3.1). The usual approach to
 solving this problem is to assume a single value for M > q\ + q^ and then to
 compute: Sj = fy and s0 = 1 ? ^\ Sj, but prior work usually provides little
 discussion as to the sensitivity of results to different market potential sizes. To
 investigate this issue, estimation with logit (both with and with
 out misspecification) is carried out using numerous market potential sizes.
 In order to accommodate all 500 observations in each data set and given
 the lack of a universal procedure for computing the market potential,
 we define 100 market potentials in the estimation of each data set as:
 Mr = [max{qu + q2t)]/r, where /=1,...,500 and r = (0.01,0.02,...,
 0.99, l).12'13
 It is important to point out that there is no theoretical counterpart in
 the data generation processes for the parameter V. Rather we use it as an
 ad-hoc way to define various market potentials (M). More importantly,
 there is no theoretical counterpart for M in continuous choice models as
 the data generating process only produces qx and q2 (not an outside
 option), but an M needs to be assumed to proceed with logit estimation.
 Although in the case of logit generated data there is a 'true' market
 potential that comes in the form of the outside good share (%), it varies
 with each observation because of the stochastic nature of the market (see
 section 3.1). Hence, even in a logit generated data set there is no single
 theoretical M.
 We use two-stage least squares where the instruments include the own
 and rival-cost shifter (co) as well as the rival's product characteristic (x).
 When the data is generated by logit and estimated by continuous choice
 models, however, we exclude the rival's product characteristic as an
 instrument. The reason for this exclusion is that logit's particular functional
 form forces the rival's product characteristic to be an omitted variable in the
 error term specified in the continuous choice models. This, in turn, violates
 the orthogonality condition required for a valid instrumental variable. If the
 12 When data is generated by logit, the formula employed is Mr = max((si, + s2[)k) /r,
 where k is any scalar. We set k = 50 because it is consistent with the market potential sizes
 observed in the other demand specifications.
 13 Simulated data have a broader range of values than real data because large random draws
 are inevitable. Hence, the use of this ad-hoc formula with real data will imply a smaller range of
 market sizes.
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation < 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 rival's product characteristic is included as an instrument, it can produce
 negative cross-price coefficients, a 'sign' bias.14
 IV(iii). Merger Analysis
 The merged firm has two first order conditions:
 The derivative term, #^, and Sj are a function of the demand estimates and
 prices.15 Hence, given a set of demand parameters, the unknowns in these
 two first order conditions are prices. Using the incorrect demand functional
 form to simulate post-merger prices can produce biased results even when
 pre-merger elasticities are estimated without bias. Intuitively, this arises
 because elasticities of different demand specifications react differently to a
 given price change, and price-elasticities are the main determinant of firms'
 profit-maximizing behavior (Crooke et al. [1999]). This additional 'extra
 polation' bias can thus be confounded with the estimation bias that is the
 focus of our study. We consider an alternative merger simulation metric that
 is free of this problem (Werden [1996]): the marginal cost needed to keep
 post-merger prices at the pre-merger level, the 'compensating marginal cost;'
 this term is denoted mcck?mp (k = 1,2) and is the solution to the 2-equation
 system:
 Using the demand estimates of the each of the 4 models on each data set,
 we conduct a search for: a) the prices that would satisfy the two first order
 conditions in (1) and the marginal costs that would satisfy the two first order
 conditions in (2).
 IV(iv). Computational Details
 We encountered several difficulties in our Monte Carlo experiment. First, we
 experienced large computational times in the search for equilibrium prices
 and quantities for the post-merger AIDS case. Also, we occasionally found
 14 Negative cross-price elasticities are not uncommon in continuous choice models (see
 Hausman, Leonard and Zona [1994]; Hausman [1996[19]]).
 15 The only exception is the linear demand case, which has a derivative that does not depend
 on price.
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 unusual data points with very large prices or quantities in the log-linear case
 and non-convergence points in the AIDS case. As explained earlier, these
 difficulties are part of the reason why we restricted our analysis to three
 elasticity cases and a symmetric duopoly.
 The M/M elasticity case and the log-linear demand are excluded from
 merger simulations. The M/M elasticity case often proved to be
 computationally intractable, which we attribute to the implausibly large
 cross-price elasticitiy (~ 1.40). Log-linear demand is also a restrictive
 specification as it forces elasticities to be identical at any point ofthe demand
 curve; this unique functional form creates large price and quantity outliers
 that are often difficult to deal with.
 Also, to reduce computational time, and following Crooke et al., we
 impose homothetic preferences (/}/ = 0) in the AIDS model.16 Because of
 adding up, symmetry and homogeneity, q0 in the AIDS model is defined by
 an identity and hence does not need to be solved numerically. It is computed
 to check that the fixed total expenditures are greater than the combined sales
 of goods 1 and 2 (x>p\q\ + piqi).
 V. RESULTS
 V(i). Elasticities
 Table II reports the means and standard errors of the elasticities across the
 100 iterations ofthe Monte Carlo experiment. Because the duopoly we study
 is symmetric, we only report firm l's own- and cross-price elasticities
 0?n' *7i2)- The data generating models are indicated in the first column ofthe
 table. The next columns report the elasticities calculated at the true
 parameters of each of the models. Note that the true elasticities are not
 exactly the same across the four demand models; this is because equilibrium
 prices and quantities are a function of stochastic terms (except for the
 deterministic log-linear case). The next four sets of columns in the table
 report the elasticity estimates obtained with each ofthe four demand models
 considered.
 Recall that logit's estimates depend on the assumed market potential
 when aggregate quantity data (qx and q2) are observed. As a consequence,
 the results of logit estimation when aggregate data is observed are not
 reported in column 1; instead figures 1-3 plot the mean logit elasticities
 against each ofthe 100 different market potentials considered, each figure
 corresponding to a demand specification and an elasticity case.17 The only
 logit estimates reported in table II correspond to the case when the
 16 We also conducted a smaller number of iterations with ft^O and found similar results.
 17 In the case of logit demand, figures 1 A, 2 A and 3 A report the elasticities computed with a
 logit model using aggregate quantity (not shares) data. Footnote 12 reports the procedure used
 to transform logit generated market shares to aggregate quantities.
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 m? oo
 ?| Table II ^
 | h Monte Carlo Elasticity Estimates with Correct and Misspecified Models
 y n -__
 > Elasticities at True Parameters Elasticities of Estimated Model*
 ? n Cases** Logit*** Linear AIDS Log-linear n
 ? Generation ?
 3 Model Elasticity M/M M/L H/L M/M M/L H/L M/M M/L H/L M/M M/L H/L M/M M/L H/L g
 ? Logit ^i(own) -1.69 -2.10 -2.99 -1.72 -2.10 -3.01 -1.22 -1.94 -2.49 -1.23 -2.55 -3.29 -1.29 -2.12 -3.24 ?
 % 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.44 0.28 0.20 4.04 0.45 0.30 5.96 0.58 0.39 4.24 0.57 0.42 Q
 | ri 12 (cross) 1.41 0.64 0.60 1.44 0.64 0.60 0.96 0.68 0.46 0.95 0.87 0.53 1.12 0.84 0.59 ?
 ? 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.38 0.09 0.04 5.93 0.52 0.34 5.28 0.68 0.43 4.51 0.60 0.40 C CZ Linear >/u(own) -1.69 -2.06 -2.99 -1.67 -2.06 -2.99 -1.70 -2.10 -3.06 -1.69 -2.11 -3.14 >
 | 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.19 q
 w ^712 (cross) 1.43 0.62 0.61 1.43 0.62 0.61 1.45 0.63 0.62 1.44 0.63 0.64 -
 | 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.08 ?
 % AIDS >/n(own) -1.71 -2.05 -3.02 -1.71 -2.07 -3.06 -1.71 -2.05 -3.01 -1.74 -2.09 -3.13 3
 % 0.01 0.01 0.01 See Figures 1 to 3 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 % I r}n (cross) 1.44 0.62 0.62 1.51 0.63 0.64 1.4  0.62 0.62 1.56 0.64 .66 S
 W 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 g
 1 Log-linear ?m(own) -170 -2.06 -3.00 -1.70 -2.14 -3.04 -1.81 -2.22 -2.85 -1.75 -2.11 -3.00 ?
 g n/a n/a n/a 0.39 0.34 0.43 0.57 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.29 O
 >7,  (cross) 1.43 0.  0.60 1 42 . 0.60 67 68 0.56 .44 0.62 0.6 ?
 S. n/a n/a n/a 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14 u>
 3- _ >
 2 *Computed with each model's estimated parameters. Grey cells denote estimated model is the same as data generation model. Q
 | **M/M = Medium own-price and medium cross-price elasticities. M/L = Medium own-price and low cross-price elasticities. H/L = High own-price and low cross-price elasticities. ti
 ^ ***Results in this column assume the true (i.e., simulated) shares (and hence market potential) are observed by the econometrician when data is generated by logit. When the C
 8 econometrician only observes aggregate quantity data, logit results depend on the assumed market potential; we consider 100 possible market potentials in figures 1 to 3 for this latter 2!
 o case. *
 h Notes: Reported are the mean elasticities across 100 iterations (of 500 random draws each), standard errors are in italics. Standard errors are not computed for the true elasticities in ;>
 Z the log-linear model because elasticities are fixed scalars. ?2
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 econometrician observes market share data (% s\ and s2) and hence the
 correct market potential is used in every observation. To summarize, the grey
 cells in table II denote that the true data generating model is used to compute
 the elasticities (i.e., there is no misspecification).
 Table II shows that, as expected, there are no biases when elasticities are
 estimated with the true model (and the correct market potential in the case of
 logit). When there is misspecification among the continuous choice models
 (linear, log-linear and AIDS), the biases are non-existent or small (when the
 true model is log-linear, AIDS appears to produce results that are slightly
 different from the true ones). When the true model is logit, the three
 continuous choice models estimate elasticities with some biases: linear tends
 to under-predict the magnitude of elasticities (except in the M/M cross
 price elasticity case), whereas both AIDS and log-linear under-predict the
 magnitude of elasticities in the M/M case but tend to over-predict the
 magnitude of elasticities in the M/L and H/L cases. Importantly, in several
 of these cases elasticities are estimated with large standard errors, making
 them statistically insignificant.18
 Turning to logit elasticity estimates in figures 1-3, we observe several
 patterns. First, there tends to be a monotonic relationship between market
 potential size and elasticity magnitudes: own- and cross-price elasticities are
 smaller in absolute value (i.e., biased toward zero) when market potential is
 large (small r) and larger otherwise. Second, cross-price elasticity biases are
 more severe than the own-price elasticity bias, except in the M/L and H/L
 cases with logit-generated data. When there is convergence to the true
 parameters, both own- and cross-price elasticities are accurately estimated
 with similar market potential values, and in the case of logit with the same
 market potential value. Finally, when the difference in the absolute value of
 own- and cross-price elasticity increases a larger market potential is needed
 to accurately recover true elasticities.
 Figures when data is generated by log-linear (ID, 2D, 3D) and in the M/M
 case (1A-1C) show somewhat different patterns than other figures. Logit
 estimates of log-linear data do not show important biases in own-price
 elasticity estimates but show large cross-price elasticity biases that do not
 decrease dramatically when market potential decreases (larger r).19 We
 attribute these patterns to the restrictive constant elasticity structure implied
 by the log-linear specification. Figures 1A-1C show that estimated own- and
 18 Continuous choice models' estimates are sensitive to outliers (e.g., large quantity data
 points), but excluding outliers from estimation did not improve their estimates of logits'
 elasticities.
 19 Because log-linear simulations sometimes produce large equilibrium quantity outliers, the
 market potentials tend to be larger than in other cases. To reduce this problem, market
 potentials in figures ID, 2D, 3D exclude the largest 5% and the smallest 5% simulated quantity
 data points. We also modified these figures (not shown) by extending the range of r to 2, but
 convergence to the true parameters only occurs for the cross-price elasticity in the H/L case.
 (n 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation r 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 Figure 1
 Logit Elasticities for Different Market Potentials, Medium-Medium Elasticity Case
 Notes: Solid lines represent true elasticities. A point on the dashed and dotted lines represents
 the mean of the computed elasticities (own- and cross-, respectively) across the 100 simulated data
 sets under a given market potential. A larger market potential parameter (r) indicates a smaller
 market potential.
 cross-price elasticity estimates rapidly increase in absolute value as r
 approaches 1 (market potential becomes smaller) but do not fully converge
 the true parameters. The M/M case results need to be interpreted with care,
 however, as this case implies an implausibly large cross-price elasticity which
 may never be observed in actual markets.20
 20 A cross-price elasticity greater than 1 is rarely observed in empirical work; this value
 implies the unlikely effect that a 10% price increase will result in a larger than 10% increase in
 quantity sold by the competitor.
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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 Figure 2
 Logit Elasticities For Different Market Potentials, Medium-Low Elasticity Case
 Notes: Solid lines represent true elasticities. A point on the dashed and dotted lines represents
 the mean ofthe computed elasticities (own- and cross-, respectively) across the 100 simulated data
 sets under a given market potential. A larger market potential parameter (r) indicates a smaller
 market potential. The x-axis in the linear case is cut-off at 0.80 to allow for the same range on the
 y-axis ( ? 3 to 2).
 Results of table II and figures 1-3 indicate that, overall, biases are larger
 when the own- and cross-price elasticities are closer in absolute value (M/M
 case) and smaller when the own- and cross-price elasticities are further apart
 in absolute value (H/L case).
 Overall, the results in this section suggest that the logit model may be able
 to recover the true elasticities of data generated by models that do not
 explicitly assume a discrete purchase decision. However, when there is no
 misspecification, logit may fail to recover the true own- and cross-price
 O 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation c 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 Figure 3
 Logit Elasticities for Different Market Potentials, High-Low Elasticity Case
 Notes: Solid lines represent true elasticities. A point on the dashed and dotted lines represents
 the mean of the computed elasticities (own- and cross-, respectively) across the 100 simulated data
 sets under a given market potential. A larger market potential parameter (r) indicates a smaller
 market potential. The x-axis in the linear case is cut-off at 0.80 to allow for the same range on the
 y-axis (- 5 to 2).
 elasticities while continuous choice models do not suffer from this potential
 pitfall. One reason for the observed patterns in these simulations is that
 continuous choice models estimate own- and cross-price elasticities with
 different parameters (4 in this case, 2 for own- and 2 for cross-price), whereas
 a single parameter is used in all logit elasticities. Thus, the different
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
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 continuous choice models tend to produce similar results among them, but
 they are different than those of logit.
 V(ii). Mergers
 We compare: a) the simulated post-merger equilibrium prices predicted by
 the true model with those predicted by the misspecified model, and b) the
 compensating marginal cost predicted by the true model with that predicted
 by the misspecified model. To focus on model misspecification only, in this
 section we assume that there is no market potential misspecification when
 logit is not misspecified (i.e., the econometrician observes the correct market
 potential when data is generated and estimated by logit).
 We report three 'precision' statistics for the variable of interest CS', where S
 is either the post-merger price or the compensating marginal cost. Because of
 symmetry we only report results for one of the two prices. The first statistic
 (Accuracy) measures the overall accuracy of the misspecified model in
 predicting the true 'S' and is equal to the median of squared deviations
 (MSD), where the a deviation is defined by the difference between the S
 predicted by the correct (true) model and the S predicted by the misspecified
 (false) model: deviation = (Strue - S^alse) 2l The closer this statistic is to zero,
 the more accurate is the prediction of the misspecified model.
 The second statistic looks at the extent to which the S predicted by the
 misspecified (false) model 'under-predict' the correct (true) S:
 % Under - predicted = 100 x -v -J
 where I(R) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if argument R > 0,
 and /indexes each of the total 50,000 S's (500 observations x 100 markets).22
 A third statistic measures whether the misspecified model correctly predicts
 the direction of change in S (positive of negative) predicted by the true model
 as a result of the merger23:
 % Correct Change = 100
 50,000
 21 We use the median instead of the mean to eliminate the sensitivity of the statistic to extreme
 outliers.
 22 The '% over-predicted' statistic is defined as (1 ? % under-predicted).
 23 Analytically, given our demand and cost parameters, post-merger prices should always be
 higher than pre-merger prices when there is no misspecification. Since we are dealing with a
 stochastic environment, there are a few instances where the draws of the random terms are such
 that a price decrease is observed. This is why we adopt the word 'change' instead of'increase.'
 ,c 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ( 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
 Economics.
 828 DONGLING HUANG, CHRISTIAN ROJAS AND FRANK BASS
 where /( ) is defined as before, G(R) is an indicator function that takes a
 value of 1 if argument R = 0.
 Simulated pre-merger prices and marginal costs (not shown) across the
 four demand models are roughly equal and thus accuracy statistics across
 cases in a given elasticity case are readily comparable. In this section we
 exclude the log-linear model and the M/M for reasons explained in section 4.
 Also, to conserve space we only report the results of three market potentials
 (r = 0.25, 0.50,0.75).
 Post-Merger Prices. Table III reports the results of the constructed
 statistics. Consistent with our elasticity findings, overall accuracy is greater
 in the H/L case, which has own- and cross-price elasticities further apart (in
 absolute value). When the true model is logit, the linear model is more
 accurate than AIDS in predicting post-merger prices in the M/L case
 (smaller MSD) but both continuous choice models predict approximately
 equally well in the H/L case. Somewhat surprisingly, when the true model is
 linear, logit's performance as measured by MSD is better than AIDS, except
 in the H/L case when r = 0.75, where logit's MSD is twice that of AIDS' but
 still very small. Also, when the true model is linear, logit and AIDS are
 equally accurate at predicting the direction of price changes but AIDS
 always over-predicts post-merger prices whereas logit's % of under
 predicted post-merger prices varies with market potential. When the true
 model is AIDS, linear and logit models appear to do similarly well in
 predicting post-merger prices: MSD's are not too dissimilar, the direction of
 price change is almost always correctly predicted, and there tends to be
 under-prediction.
 It is important to note that values of V that yield elasticity estimates of
 logit that are close to the true elasticities of linear and AIDS (figures 3B and
 3C) do not necessarily yield the highest accuracy in predicting the true post
 merger prices of linear and AIDS. To see this, consider logit's accuracy in
 predicting post-merger prices when data is generated by AIDS in the H/L
 elasticity case. From figure 3C, r = 0.50 appears as the market potential
 parameter (from the 3 being considered here) that would yield elasticities
 closest to the true values. However, r = 0.75 yields a smaller MSD and a
 smaller fraction of under-predicted post-merger prices than r = 0.50. The
 reason for this result is the 'extrapolation' bias that was explained in section 4.
 Thus, we deliberately omit an analysis ofthe 'optimal' V size that produces
 the highest accuracy in predicting post-merger prices.
 Logit always predicts the correct direction of change in prices as a result of
 the merger. Interestingly, misspecification among continuous choice models
 (i.e., AIDS estimated with linear and vice versa) yield relatively large MSD in
 the M/L case, and in the H/L case such predictions are not much more precise
 than logit's. While the AIDS functional form has been claimed to be
 preferable to other continuous choice models because of its flexible
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 I Table III Z
 1 Prediction Accuracy of Post-Merger Prices by Misspecified Models O
 o ___^____^_^_ M o- ^
 3 Model Used for Post-Merger Price Prediction ^
 |. Logit** Linear AIDS 2
 3 -.-.-.- - - W
 2 Data M/L H/L M/L H/L M/L H/L ^
 ? Generation Accuracy in
 2 Model Statistics*** r = 0.25 r = 0.50 r = 0.75 r = 0.25 r = 0.50 r = 0.75 d
 | - -.-.- - 2
 * Logit MSD .-...- 0.53 0.2 2.4 0.21 >
 | % Under-predicted .-___. 56% 55% 32% 55% g
 | % Correct Change ------ 80% 62% 81% 64% O
 | Linear MSD 0.013 0.014 0.026 0.0003 0.004 0.015 - - 0.77 0.007 ^
 | % Under-predicted 100% 10% 0% 73% 0% 0% - - 0% 0% h
 r % Correct Change 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - - 100% 100% X
 J AIDS MSD 1.15 0.91 0.71 0.013 0.004 0.001 0.83 0.006 - - >
 g. % Under-predicted 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 61% 100% 100% - - 2
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 Figure 4
 Distribution of Difference between True Post-Merger Price (Logit) and Misspecified Post-Merger
 Price (Linear or AIDS)
 approximation to any demand system and the tight link of its parameters to
 theory, it is unclear that it performs better than linear demand when used to
 compute the post-merger prices of another model. Furthermore, when data is
 generated with linear demand, the logit model does an overall better job than
 AIDS at predicting post-merger prices.
 We find that certain misspecifications produce consistent under-predictions
 or over-predictions of post-merger prices. When misspecified, the logit model
 tends to under-predict the post-merger prices for larger market potentials
 (smaller r). A similar case arises when the linear model is used to compute the
 post-merger prices of data that is generated by AIDS. AIDS, on the other
 hand, always over-predicts post-merger prices when the true model is linear.
 Figures 4 through 6 display the (kernel smoothed) distributions of the
 difference between the post-merger price predicted by the true model (logit: 4,
 linear: 5 and AIDS: 6) and the post-merger price as predicted by the incorrect
 models. These figures, which correspond to the H/L case24, confirm the
 patterns observed in the accuracy statistics. Linear and AIDS do
 approximately equally well in predicting logit post-merger prices and there
 are no clear under- or over-prediction patterns. AIDS over-predicts linear
 post-merger prices but under-prediction occurs in the opposite direction (i.e.,
 when AIDS is the true model and linear is the incorrect model). Logit
 24 The patterns are similar in the M/L case figures.
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 Figure 5
 Distribution of Difference between True Post-Merger Price (Linear) and Misspecified Post
 Merger Price (AIDS or Logit)
 predictions vary by market potential, yielding distributions more closely
 distributed around zero for r = 0.25 and r = 0.75, for linear and AIDS data,
 respectively. The figures also provide a clearer picture of whole range of values
 of the difference in simulated post-merger prices: the x-axis range of figure 4 is
 one order of magnitude larger than in figures 5 and 6, confirming the relatively
 larger inaccuracy of continuous choice models when predicting logit's post
 merger prices.
 Compensating Marginal Cost Compensating marginal cost is not only a
 metric that is free of extrapolation bias but it is also more reliable because
 simple matrix inversion renders it easy and fast to compute (i.e., there are no
 convergence problems). Table IV shows the results of the computed
 statistics. Our findings here are very consistent with elasticity results. First,
 when data is generated by continuous choice models, logit can approximate
 well the compensating marginal cost, and in many cases produces MSD that
 are smaller than those of continuous choice models. As with elasticities,
 logit's approximation of continuous choice models' compensating marginal
 costs can improve with the choice of market potential: when data is
 generated by linear, a reasonable r for estimating the compensating marginal
 cost is 0.5 for the M/L case and (apparently) slightly lower than 0.5 for the
 H/L case. When data is generated by AIDS, a reasonable r for estimating
 the compensating marginal cost appears to be between 0.5 and 0.75 for the
 M/L case and about 0.5 for the H/L case. We simulated additional cases for
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation ? 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 Figure 6
 Distribution of Difference between True Post-Merger Price (AIDS) and Misspecified Post-Merger
 Price (Logit or Linear)
 Notes: r = market potential parameter. A larger r implies a smaller market potential. Figures
 correspond to H/L case.
 other values of r (not shown) and confirmed a u-shape relationship: there is
 an optimal value of r that yields minimal MSD (and no significant over
 prediction or under-prediction) and values or r above and below this optimal
 level reduce predictive accuracy. Importantly, these optimal values of
 r correspond to the values of r that also yield elasticity estimates close to the
 true values.
 Second, marginal cost reductions are well approximated when the wrong
 continuous choice model is used (e.g., AIDS used when linear is the true
 model). However, when data is generated by logit, continuous choice models
 approximate the true marginal cost reduction poorly (although with no
 under- or over-prediciton patterns) as evidenced by the relatively large MSD
 statistic. Figures 7 through 9 display the (kernel smoothed) distributions of
 the difference between the compensating marginal cost predicted by the true
 model (logit: 7, linear: 8 and AIDS: 9) and the compensating marginal cost
 predicted by the incorrect models. These figures, which correspond to the
 H/L case25, confirm the patterns observed in table IV.
 VI. DISCUSSION
 We investigate the implications of functional form misspecification in
 demand estimation when only aggregate data is observed. We focus on: a)
 25 The patterns are similar in the M/L case figures.
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 w Model Statistics*** r = 0.25 r = 0.50 r = 0.75 r = 0.25 r = 0.50 r = 0.75 d
 |-g
 *T Logit MSD ...... 2.52 0.771 4.11 1.202 >
 | % Under-predicted .__... 48% 50% 26% 29% ^
 | % Correct Change ------ 90% 99% 89% 97% O
 |! Linear MSD 0.092 0.005 0.142 0.009 0.002 0.045 - - 0.015 0.007 ^
 3' % Under-predicted 0% 39% 100% 11% 72% 99% - - 40% 41% ^
 r % Correct Change 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - - 100% 100% X
 ?* AIDS MSD 0.09 0.059 0.10 0.008 0.006 0.013 0.11 0.02 - - >
 g. % Under-predicted 13% 34% 56% 14% 43% 64% 50% 49% - - 2
 3- % Correct Change 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% - - ?
 S-?- ^o
 S *M/L = Medium own-price elasticity (~ - 2) and low cross-price elasticity (~ 0.60) case. H/L = High own-price elasticity (~ - 3) and low cross-price elasticity (~ 060) case. 5j
 EL **r = market potential parameter. A lower r implies a larger market potential. ^
 o ***MSD = Median squared deviations, deviation = (Compensating MC. true model) - (Compensating MC. false model). % Under-predicted = % of times that the Compensating f^
 B. MC of the false model are lower than the Compensating MC of true model. % Correct change = % of times that the Compensating MC of the false model correctly predicts the O
 ^ change in MC from the pre-merger level to the Compensating level of the true model. S
 z o g m3 ^ o s1 a.
 S oo
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 Figure 7
 Distribution of Difference between True Compensating Marginal Cost (Logit) and Misspecified
 Compensating Marginal Cost (Linear or AIDS)
 7 r i-1 -MC Linear - MC AIDS
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 6 " / \ .MC Linear - MC Logit r=0.50
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 Figure 8
 Distribution of Difference between True Compensating Marginal Cost (Linear) and Misspecified
 Compensating Marginal Cost (AIDS or Logit)
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 5r
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 Figure 9
 Distribution of Difference between True Compensating Marginal Cost (AIDS) and Misspecified
 Compensating Marginal Cost (Logit or Linear)
 Notes: r = market potential parameter. A larger r implies a smaller market potential. Figures
 correspond to H/L case. Compensating marginal cost is defined as the (lower) post-merger
 marginal cost needed to keep post-merger prices at pre-merger levels.
 biases in elasticity estimates, and b) accuracy in merger simulation of post
 merger prices and compensating marginal costs. Consistent with the recent
 literature in empirical industrial organization, we adopt a structural
 approach: we center our attention in the consistent estimation of the
 economic parameters ofthe model. We study two strands of demand models
 that have been popular in the literature: discrete choice models (logit) and
 continuous choice models (AIDS, linear and log-linear).
 A somewhat expected result is that biases can arise when continuous
 choice models (linear, AIDS and log-linear) are used to estimate demand
 with data that is generated with a discrete choice model (logit), and vice
 versa. A less obvious finding is that the assumed market potential in logit
 estimation is a key element in recovering the true elasticities. This result
 carries over to post-merger simulations using a compensating marginal cost
 metric. One conclusion of our study is that the market potential assumption
 needs to be more carefully addressed by researchers using the logit model
 with aggregate data.
 In our simulations, the market potential that recovers the true own-price
 elasticity is not the same as the market potential that recovers the true cross
 price elasticity (except when the true model is logit), but these market
 potentials are always close. In prior work, a usual practice in defining the
 ? 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation Z 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.
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 potential market is to use the whole population as potential consumers; for
 example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes use the driving population, Nevo
 [2001] assumes one serving of cereal times the population of the city, and
 Chintagunta et al. [2003] consider the weekly store traffic. Defining market
 potential in this way could produce an overestimated market potential as
 only a fraction of the population may consider purchasing a particular
 product at a given time (e.g., a family of two that already owns two cars or
 that has a low income level). This problem can be magnified in applications
 where researchers only have a sample of the data.26 It is hence possible that
 the small magnitude of cross-price elasticities typically found in these studies
 may be due in part to a market potential that is too large.
 A potential solution for obtaining a market potential in the logit model is
 to estimate it directly. This would amount to rewriting logit's estimable
 equation to include the market potential 'M\ which enters Sj and s0.
 Estimation of this parameter, however, needs to be carefully thought out as
 it is not clear what variation in the data provides the identification of this
 constant. We leave this task for future research, but conjecture that in more
 complex versions of logit (such as random coefficients) the estimation of this
 additional parameter is unlikely to add significant computational burden for
 the researcher (provided identification).27
 A less optimal solution for market potential estimation is to carry out
 sensitivity analysis. Our results for the more plausible M/L and H/L cases
 (excluding the restrictive log-linear specification) show that when a
 reasonable market potential is assumed (a market potential between the
 optimal own-price elasticity market potential and the optimal cross-price
 elasticity market potential), a larger market potential (smaller r) will not
 affect own-price elasticity but will bias cross-price elasticity towards zero
 whereas smaller market potentials (larger r) will bias both elasticities away
 from zero. Researchers could then search for a market potential that
 behaves in this way. We provide this suggestion with caution as it may not
 hold for more complex cases.
 Merger results suggest that employing a continuous choice model that is
 different from the one from which data is generated is no guarantee of
 obtaining results that are more accurate than those obtained by a logit
 model. Moreover, when the true model is logit, continuous choice models do
 a poor job at predicting the true post-merger prices. Again, with the logit
 model one needs to be very careful when defining the market potential as it
 can produce misleading results. For example, assuming too large a market
 potential (as it seems plausible in previous work) may lead authorities to
 26 For example, Nevo [2001] uses data from a sample of supermarkets which covers only a
 fraction of all grocery sales in a metropolitan area.
 27 Reiss and Wolak also suggest this approach but offer limited details on how it can be
 carried out.
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 allow a merger that must have been blocked otherwise. This is supported by
 our results: when r goes to zero post-merger prices are underpredicted and
 compensating marginal costs are overpredicted.
 A motivation for this paper was to investigate the restrictiveness of
 assuming a discrete choice model when the purchase decision appears not to
 be discrete. Our results consistently suggest that such misspecification is not
 too important as long as market potential is carefully defined. Moreover,
 this result also appears to hold in our preliminary simulations with three
 goods and random coefficients logit (not shown here).
 While our initial objective was not to choose a better model, we interpret
 our results as favorable to the logit model. The advantages of using a logit
 model when the true model is not logit are that it can recover true elasticities
 even when misspecified and that it tends to predict more accurate post
 merger prices and compensating marginal costs. Also, when misspecified,
 continuous choice models can produce larger biases and even 'wrong
 signed' elasticities if the instruments are not appropriately chosen (see
 section 4), while logit does not suffer from this latter pitfall. The fact that
 biases of using a continuous choice model could be larger than those from
 using a discrete choice model is a little counterintuitive since, in principle, the
 larger number of parameters in continuous choice models should provide
 them with the advantage of capturing substitution patterns more freely than
 a model that recovers them using only one parameter.
 In sum, our results raise caution about inference in applications in which
 the assumed functional form is questionable. More importantly, our results
 should not only help researchers make better informed decisions about
 which model to choose but they should also help them draw more careful
 inference.
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